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ARTICLES
From "Shoeless" Joe Jackson to Ivan
Boesky: A Sporting Response to Law
and Economics Criticism of the
Regulation of Insider Trading
BY DONALD ARTHUR WINSLOW* AND SETH C. ANDERSON**
INTRODUCTION
The wisdom of regulating insider trading has been debated at the
scholarly level for decades.' In particular, law and economics scholars
have adamantly insisted that there is no harm in insider trading2 In
response, some commentators have attempted to demonstrate to the
members of the law and economics movement the harm of insider trading
in economic terms.' In the hope of contributing to a break in the
impasse, we propose to push the debate into a more basic and amusing
level by building upon the experiences of a simple man-"Shoeless" Joe
Jackson-who learned, in a very harsh way, that some extracurricular
actions will not be tolerated.
A. Baseball and Gambling
A full seven decades before the recent Pete Rose scandal, 4
"Shoeless" Joe Jackson was banished from baseball for life for his
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky (deceased). A.B. 1975, University of
California at Los Angeles; M.B.A. 1979, Johnson Graduate School of Management; J.D. 1980,
Cornell Law School.
** Frank A. Plummer Endowed Chair in Finance and Management, Huntingdon College. B.S.
1969, University of Alabama; M.B.A. 1980, Auburn University at Montgomery; Ph.D. 1984,
University of North Carolina.
See infmr notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
'See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
'Pete Rose was permanently banned from baseball in August 1989 by then Major League
Baseball Commissioner A. Bartlett Giamatti. For a discussion of the Rose case, see Jerome Holtzman,
Glamatti Bans Rose for Life--Reds Manager Confident He'll be Reinstated in Yea?; CHi. Ttm., Aug.
25, 1989, at Cl.
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associations with gambling while active in the sport.' Gambling has
thus deprived baseball of two of its great personalities, and in turn
has cast the shadow of scandal over each man's legacy. Nonetheless,
baseball's need to restrict gambling by active participants should be
obvious: without such a restriction, this great national pastime would
be nothing but a cruel farce.
Baseball's history demonstrates the need for such controls. In the
wild, early days of the sport, bettor-spectators would crudely insert
themselves into the physical action of a game in order to influence its
outcome.6 Likewise, some players became adept at throwing games
in order to profit from a bet.' The problem of participant gambling
and game fixing came most forcefully to the nation's attention with
the Black Sox scandal associated with the 1919 World Series.8 This
scandal swept up one of the great natural talents of all
time-Shoeless" Joe Jackson. Jackson's teammate, "Chick" Gandil,
arranged for the Sox to throw the Series for cash and even placed bets
on the outcome of the Series.' Word of this arrangement leaked out
from the gamblers and led to great concern over the fixing of the
Series, as indicated by newsmen who noted suspicious plays while
keeping box scores." In succeeding years, many other great players,
including Ty Cobb and Tris Speaker, were implicated in lesser-known
betting scandals of the era."
'See id.; ELor AsiNOF, EiTrr ME OuT: THE BLAcK Sox AmD THE 1919 WoRLD SaUES, at
273 (1963).
'One author offered this sunmry of the early days of baseball:
Though rising in popularity, baseball became corrupted with almost incredible
rapidity. There was hardly a game in which some wild, disruptive incident did not occur
to alter the outcome. An outfielder, settling under a crucial fly ball, would find himself
stoned by a nearby spectator, who might win a few hundred dollars if the ball was
dropped. On one occasion, a gambler actually ran out on the field and tackled a ballplayer.
On another, a marksman prevented a fielder from chasing a long hit by peppering the
ground around his feet with bullets. The victims had no chance to appeal: there was
nothing in the rules to cover such behavior.
Asm o, supra note 5, at 10-11.
One example illustrates the problem with player betting:
The story of Hal Chase illustrates the temper of the times. Chase was a superb first
baseman, a dangerous hitter, an incorrigible troublemaker. He enjoyed the company of
gamblers, if not for pleasure, then certainly for business. An enterprising man, he quickly
learned that he needn't wait for gamblers to approach him before selling out a ball game.
He'd arrange it himself and bet accordingly. He became adept at maldng faulty plays
around first base so that everyone looked bad but himself. In the process, the outcome of
the game would be altered.
Id. at 14. It has been said that Hal Chase "[p]resumably holds the all-time record for games fixed."
BILL JAMES, THE BILL J sAMs HISroicAL BASEmALL ABsAcr 135 (1988).
'See generally ASmIOF, supra note 5, passim.
See id. at 8, 43.
See AsNor, supra note 5, at 86-88, 92-94.
See JAMES, supra note 7, at 134-39.
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Though he may not have bet against his own team," Pete Rose's
recent downfall invites comparison to the Black Sox scandal of 1919.
Moreover, because Rose was punished for betting on games in which he
was not a participant, 3 his situation illustrates the breadth of modem
baseball's gambling prohibition.
Major League Baseball currently prohibits not only betting on games
in which one is a participant, but also betting "upon any baseball
game."'4 Obviously, a game cannot allow its participants to profit by
losing, but the need for baseball's more expansive prohibition is not as
clear. Certainly part of the reason relates to baseball's need to maintain
an image of integrity: without its commercial appeal to fans, baseball
would cease to be a viable professional sport.
While concerns such as maintaining its good reputation have led the
Major League to forbid betting on any baseball games, the primary
objective of the gambling prohibition is to maintain the actual integrity
of the game. This is evident in the "death penalty" invoked when players
bet on their own games as compared to the one-year suspension imposed
for other betting. 5 In essence, this reflects a perceived need to prevent
betting that can alter a player's incentives, and thus performance, in a
given game.
The core idea of prohibiting gambling capable of affecting operations
or games is also evident in sports where gambling generally is legal, such
as horse racing. In horse racing, however, the gambling restriction is
more limited. For example, if Pat Day were a betting man and wished to
place a wager on his next mount in the Kentucky Derby, he could do so
legally; but another jockey riding in that race could not place a bet on
Day's mount. 6 If the jockey could bet against his own mount, he might
" The Pete Rose case is somewhat unclear. The official findings of Commissioner Giamatti did
not specify whether Rose actually placed bets on baseball games. But Giamatti opined separately that
Rose did bet on games, and purported to have evidence that he did. Rose denies that he ever bet on
baseball. See Holtzman, supra note 4, at Cl; Pam E. RosE & RoGat KAHN, My STORY: Pm Rosa
231-71 (1989).
"See sources cited supra note 12.
"Major League Rule 21 addresses "MISCONDUCT."Under section (d) of that rle, entitled
"BElTING ON BALL GAMES":
Any player, umpire, or club or league official or employee, who shall bet any sum
whatsoever upon any baseball game in connection with which the better has no duty to
perform, shall be declared ineligible for one year.
Any player, umpire, or club or league official or employee, who shall bet any sum
whatsoever upon any baseball game in connection with which the better has a duty or
perform shall be declared permanently ineligible.
Major League Rule 21(d), reprinted in 1985 BASEALL BLUEBWK at 560.
U See id.
The Kentucky State Racing Commission Rules provide that:
No rider shall place a wager, or cause a wager to be placed on his behalf, or accpt
any ticket or winnings from a wager on any race except on his own mount, and except
through the owner or trainer of the horse he is riding. Such owner or trainer placing
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be tempted to throw the race. The sport simply cannot tolerate such a
possibility.
B. Managers Are Situated As Ballplayers
The stories of "Shoeless" Joe Jackson and Pete Rose provide a good
starting point from which to consider insider trading laws. Just as
regulation of participant betting in sports protects other bettors from the
possibility that the athletes might throw an event to profit by a bet,
regulation of insider trading protects the stockholders generally from the
possibility that corporate managers might harn the company in order to
profit by stock trading. And to preserve the appearance of propriety and
address other concerns, 7 insider trading regulation should entail a more
general prohibition, similar to that found in baseball, instead of a more
limited proscription such as that found in horse racing."
Trading in stock by insiders, such as directors and executives, based
on inside information-corporate information not available to the
public-has been restricted by the federal securities laws for several
decades." In recent years, much publicity has been given to high-profile
violators of the securities laws. Often, these violators are connected in
information-sharing networks, such as those linked to the operations of
Ivan Boesky and Dennis Levine." One might think, especially in light
of the publicity surrounding such individuals and their scandals, that the
regulation of insider trading would hold an unchallenged place in the law.
This, however, is not the case.
wagers for his rider shall maintain a precise and complete record of all such wagers, and
such record shall be available for examination by the stewards at all times.
Kentucky State Racing Commission Rules, 810 Ky. ADMiN. REs. 1:009 (1990).
"See inh& notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, §§ 10(b), 16(b), (c), 48 Stat. 881,
891, 896-97 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b), (c), 78j(b) (1988)); see also Securities
Exchange Act Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. 240, lOb-5 (1991).
For an informative survey of famous insider traders and their subsequent activities, see Bryan
Burrough, After the Fall: Fates are Disparate for Those Charged with Insider Trading, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 18, 1987, at 1. The subsequent paths of those involved in these cases are remarkable for their
diversity. Boesky, while awaiting sentencing, became a student in a theological seminary. Levine,
who like Boesky went to prison, found that his fellow prisoners ostracized him as a squealer. Dirks,
who was absolved by the Supreme Court, found that his notoriety had benefits for a broker as people
would now return his calls. Chiarella, who avoided conviction as a result of the Supreme Court
decision in his case, regards himself as "a martyr for insider trading" and has found his ultimate
punishment to be rejection by women who consider his involvement in the scandal distasteful. Id.
As is apparent from the above article, many of these culprits worked in groups. See JAMES B.
STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 13-17 (1991) (discussing Milken, Boesky, Siegal, and Levine); see also
H.R. REP. No. 910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-14 (1988) (discussing the insider trading group "Yuppie
Five" and others); Sherry R. Sentry, An SEC Victory or Not?, NAT'L U.., Dec. 7, 1987, at 3
(discussing R. Foster Winans and his associates).
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For about twenty-five years, regulation of insider trading has been
under a strong intellectual challenge, initiated by Professor Henry Manne,
from a law and economics perspective." Under Manne's view, insider
trading is a victimless crime that actually can be helpful to the market.
Subsequent proponents of Manne's theory have added new vigor to this
position.' A rival faction, critical of the law and economics position,
has also emerged. These critics have primarily focused on the issues of
fairness and equal access to information.e Only occasionally have critics
of the law and economics position touched upon economic arguments.'
This Article will respond to the economic arguments against
regulating insider trading in part by analogizing the regulation of
insider trading to the prohibition of gambling imposed on baseball
players. Just as gambling played a significant role in the outcome of
the 1919 World Series,' the economic incentives offered by insider
trading can affect corporate operations and managers to the detriment
21 See HENRY G. MANNF, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STocK MARKEr (1966) [hereinafter
MAmE I]; Hemy G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. Rev. 547 (1970)
[hereinafter Mane II]; see also Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 857 1 (1983) (asserting that Professor Mane's book constitutes
the "starting point for anyone interested in the subject").
' See, eg., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21; Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading Secret
Agents, Evidentiary Pivileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 309; David
D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1449
(1986) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey I]; David D. Haddock & Jonathan M Macey, Regulation on
Demand: A Private Interest Model, With an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. &
EcoN. 311 (1987) [hereinafter Haddock & Macey H]; Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to
Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 13 HOFnTA L. Rev. 9 (1984)
[hereinafter Macey I]; Kenneth F. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 1ob-5. Disclosure and Corporate
Privacy, 9 . LEGAL STrDms 801 (1980). For a helpful summary of the arguments with an approach
that is distinctly critical of the regulation of insider trading, see JONATHAN R. MAcEY, INsn)ER TRAD-
ING-EcoNOMICS, PoLrTcS, AND Poucy (1991) [hereinafter MAcEY II].
"See, eg., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic
Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. Rev. 35, 63 (1986) (leaning toward regulation); Victor Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. Re. 322
(1979); David Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to Professor Manne, 23 VAm.
L. Rev. 621 (1970); Robert . Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency
of the Large Corporation, 80 McH. L. Rev. 1051 (1982); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets:
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117 (1982) [hereinafter Levmore I]; Saul
Levmore, In Defense of the Regulation of Insider Trading, 11 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 101 (1988)
[hereinafter Levmore 11]; Ray A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, 53 VA. L. REv.
1425 (1967); Joel Seligman, The Refomulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic
Information, 73 GEo. L. 1083 (1985). For an analysis of the potential harms from insider trading
that does not take a position on whether it should be prohibited, see William K.S. Wang, Trading
on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: Who is Harmed and Who Can Sue
Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-S?, 54 S. CAL. L. R v. 1217 (1981).
3 See, eg., ROBERT C. CLAM, COIuORATE LAW 265-94 (1986) (analyzing the four chief harms
of insider trading: harm to the corporation, to investors, to the market and to economic efficiency).
Professor Clark recognizes the argument of Professor Manne that the efficiency theory is trivial
because it does not discourage investors. Id. at 274-75 (citing Manne II, supra note 21, at 577).
"See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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of the best interests of the shareholders. This analogy reveals that
insider trading, like gambling by the participants of major league
baseball games, should be regulated. Also, reasons other than the risk
of negative incentives, such as the protection of the purity of the
game, have led baseball to extend its prohibitions on betting to cover
not only the obviously corrupt practice of a player betting against his
own team, but also those situations in which the player-bettor bets on
his own team or even on a game in which he is not a participant.'
Likewise, insider trading regulation should be extended to cover more
situations and players. Overall, these points demonstrate that the law
and economics scholars are simply off base.
C. Overview
In particular, this Article will show that unrestricted insider
trading would give corporate managers a perverse incentive to trade
on negative corporate developments and that such an incentive could
prompt management decisions that harm the corporation. We propose
to refine the arguments against the law and economics position,
emphasizing the significance human nature bears on the insider
trading debate. The validity of these arguments can be made perfectly
clear through the analogy to baseball's solid prohibition of betting by
active participants. If "Shoeless" Joe Jackson can come to understand
the rules, or at least to accept them, then so can the members of the
law and economics intelligentsia. This Article also offers reasons for
extending the regulation beyond a limitation against trading on bad
news and addresses certain arguments commonly made by the law and
economics camp against such an extension.
Part I of this Article reviews the emergence of insider trading
regulations, the criticisms of these regulations, and recent replies to
these criticisms. Part II addresses unrestricted insider trading, includ-
ing its potential effects on firms' operations and the inadequacy of
fiduciary duty constraints to control the problem, as well as insider
trading based on positive developments in the firm. Part III deals with
the issue of corporate charters and bylaws that do not prohibit insider
trading and explains the difficulties that the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) would encounter as a public enforcer of private
prohibitions. We conclude that regulation of insider trading should not
be undercut because of ill-conceived economic-based arguments that
do not account for the economic incentives that insider trading can
give a manager to abuse his or her firm and its shareholders. These
' See Major League Rule 21(d), supra note 14.
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arguments also fail to account for other relevant concerns, particularly
the need to maintain fairness in the market and public confidence in
the market's integrity.
I. STATUS OF THE LAW AND THE DEBATE
To begin an assessment of the regulation of insider trading, it is
necessary to depart from the baseball analogy momentarily in order
to describe the development of insider trading law and some of the
accompanying literature. This background will proceed from the
emergence of the federal securities laws that regulate insider trading
to the criticisms made by the law and economics camp, and will
include a brief description of a partial adjustment in the case law.
This Part will close with a review of the responses to the criticism of
the regulation of insider trading.
A. Emergence of Insider Trading Regulation
The Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed prom-
pted passage of federal statutes designed to ensure the integrity of the
securities markets.27 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,' of par-
ticular relevance to this topic, contains numerous provisions designed
to make the playing field more fair to investors trading in issued
securities. In particular, section 16(b) of the 1934 Act permits an
issuer of securities to recover short swing profits from the sale and
purchase or purchase and sale of those securities by one who is a
director, officer, or ten percent beneficial owner the issuer.' In
addition, section 16(c) generally prohibits such persons from selling
short in the corporation's stock."
Following the passage of the 1934 Act, the SEC did not try to
regulate trading in stock based on inside information for a number of
years. About ten years after the 1934 Act, however, the Commission
- See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934) ("111e inability of the stock exchange
authorities even to discover the flagrant abuses ... indicates that a Federal regulatory body could
deal with such practices more effectively than the exchanges themselves."); H.R.FR. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934) ("[I]f investor confidence is to come back to the benefit of exchanges and
corporations alike, the law must advance").
= Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988). "Short swing"profits are profits derived from the purchase and
sale of the same security within a six-month period. Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988). A "short sale" is a contract for sale of share of stock that the
seller does not own. The seller sells borrowed stock and repays the lender with stock either held on
the date of sale or purchased after the sale. See Securities Exchange Act Rule 240.3b-3, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.3b-3 (1989).
1992-931
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promulgated Rule lOb-53  under authority granted by section 10(b)
of the Act,' the general anti-fraud provision. Rule 1Ob-5 was created
in response to a particular case in which a corporate officer was
contacting stockholders and buying up their stock based on the false
suggestion that the company was doing poorly.33
For years the scope of the prohibition emanating from Rule 1Ob-5
was not fully established. In 1961, the SEC issued an opinion in
Cady, Roberts & Co.' that articulated two reasons for a prohibition
against insider trading:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corpo-
rate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second,
the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he
is dealing.35
Insider trading was thus found to deprive companies of property rights
and was seen as unfair to less informed traders. The judiciary confronted
these issues in the landmark case of SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.'
In this case, the court determined that officers and employees violate Rule
lOb-5 when they trade on non-public good news-here, news of a massive
ore discovery by the corporation." The court focused only on the parity
of information rationale of Cady and ignored the business property
rationale.' The court stated that the basis for regulation of insider
trading under Rule 1Ob-5 derives from "the justifiable expectation that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information."39 In succeeding years, the status of Rule 1Ob-5
was further enhanced by private damage actions that also held insiders
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
3215 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
See Milton V. Freedman, Administrative Procedura, 22 Bus. LAw. 891, 922 (1967).
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
"Id at 912. Under this opinion, a director of a corporation violated Rule lOb-5 by tipping for
trading purposes upon receipt of information concerning an upcoming significant deviation from the
corporation's dividend policy. The respondent, a broker-dealer, sold stock of Curtiss-Wright upon
receiving information from his partner, a director of the company, that Curtiss-Wright would be
declaring a smaller dividend than usual. Because of difficulties Curtiss-Wright had in transmitting
this information to the New York Stock Exchange and to the Wall Sea Journal, the defendant
possessed this knowledge before the market did. Id.
401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968) ad 404 U.S. 1005
(1971).
37 Id.
Id. at 849 ("The only regulatory objective is that access to material information be enjoyed
equally .... ");see also supra note 35 and accompanying text.
1, 401 F.2d at 848.
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responsile to contemporaneous traders on the other side of large,
impersonal markets.40
B. The Criticisms by the Law and Economics School and the Supreme
Court in the 1980s
During the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation era, a dissent arose. This
dissent began to criticize regulation of insider trading. The initially
shocking contention of these critics was that insider trading was very
unlikely to harm a long-term investor and was actually good because it
served to adequately compensate the rare, gifted entrepreneur who
otherwise might not have been induced to stay in management 1
Building upon this initial criticism, a new generation of economics based
scholars have made sophisticated attacks on the broadly conceived regulation
of insider trading.42 These scholars have argued that if insider trading were
harmful to corporations, shareholders or markets, firms would have acted to
prevent it. Because the private sector has not moved to regulate insider
trading, the law and economics scholars argue, the practice must not be
harmful!' The critics fhrther assert that insider trading may be valuable in
communicating information to the market more quickly. This type of
disclosure can reduce the measures that investors must undertake to
investigate the firm. If the firm can disclose information about itself at a
lower cost, the disclosure will result in lowered expenditures on investigations
into the real value of the security and will cause investors to be more certain
about the firm." These scholars also argue that insider trading is not unfair
because everyone knows it may occur and prices are adjusted accordingly by
the market.' Finally, these critics assert that allowing management to be
compensated through insider trading increases corporate wealth because fewer
corporate funds are drained off in salaries and other forms of compensa-
tion.
Sem ag., Elkind v. Liggett Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165-66 (2d Cir. 1980) (deliberately
tipping an outsider that one believes will act on the information provides the requisite scienter);
Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that defendants were liable to all who purchased stock in the open market without inside
information).
" See MUNNE 1, supra note 21, at 111-58.
ee sources cited supra note 22.
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 858-60.
See id. at 858-59.
See Scott, supra note 22, at 807-09; see also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 881
(asserting that Scott'sobservation is a "complete response"to the claim that outsiders are "exploited");
Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 325 (discussing the stockbroker's tendency to adjust pricing as a
reaction to the risk of insider trading).
4 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 880-82; Haddock & Macey I, supra note 22, at 1454,
1992-93]
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In response to these criticisms, the Supreme Court has restricted
the scope of insider trading regulation in some well-known cases
decided in the 1980s. In Chiarella v. United States,7 the Court held
that a printing company employee who gained access to information
involving a corporate takeover did not violate 10b-5 when he traded
in the stock of the target corporation. The Court held that no duty ran
to the traders on the other side of the market from the printer and, in
the absence of a breach of duty, Chiarella owed no general duty to the
market.' This ruling made it virtually impossible to sustain a suc-
cessful private civil action by a contemporaneous trader in a case like
Chiarella.48 But the business property rationale revived the first
rationale offered in Cady for prohibiting insider trading, and the Chief
Justice in dissent would have accepted the employer's interest as a
sufficient basis upon which to premise a violation.'e Similarly, in
Dirks v. SEC5 the Court held that a broker-dealer did not violate
Rule 1Ob-5 by telling his clients (investors) about negative develop-
ments (amounting to a great scandal) concerning a corporation where
he had learned of this information from a former corporate officer
desiring to blow the whistle on wrongdoing in the corporation.' It
is important to note in this case that the former officer did not seek
to gain some personal benefit from tipping the broker, as this would
have been a breach of his fiduciary duty.53
The common theme of these case law developments is a property
rights orientation toward insider trading: a breach of established
property rights is required for the trading to be actionable.5' This
" 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
' Id at 232-33, 235.
See Macey I, supra note 22, at 47-48; see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1983), superseded by statute, Pub. L No. 100-74, § 5 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1
(1988)). The printing company would lack standing because it was not a purchaser or seller of
securities, a requirement for a Rule 10b-5 action. Blue Chip Stamp v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 754-55 (1975); Macey I, supra at 47.
" Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (misappropriation or stealing from
employer would count); see Eastetbrook, supra note 22, at 321.
5 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
Id. at 665-67.
' See id.
See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 312, 314-17, 320-23, 331 (asserting that "the central
question was whether the principal had a property interest sufficient to require the agent neither to
use nor to disclose [inside information] without the principal's consent" and criticizing the Court for
not fully recognizing this concept); Macey I, supra note 22, at 11, 27-29 (Court's direction, as
indicated in Chiarella and Dirks, is toward protection of property rights as a basis of regulating
insider trading; for example, Chiarella owed a duty of confidentiality to his employer, the holder of
the property rights, even if not to contemporaneous traders). Macey also suggests that Professors
Easterbrook, Carlton and Fischel fail to appreciate that the Court is moving in their direction. See id
at 11. See also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987) (holding that the federal mail
fraud statute is limited in scope to the protection of property rights); Carpenter v. United States, 484
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approach supports the law and economics scholars because it means
that not all trading on nonpublic information is harmful and that
activity that would otherwise constitute a breach of duty is
permissible if the corporation consents to insider trading by its
managers as a form of compensation.'
C. Replies to the Law and Economics School's Failure to Convince
The initial arguments from the law and economics scholars pro-
voked disparaging comments. These responses typically centered on
fairness and the harm to the capital markets from insider trading that
results in an increased cost of capital.' These arguments remain
today,57 and have been embraced by Congress. New federal legisla-
tion has supported and enhanced the existing insider trading regula-
tions with the goal of preserving the integrity of the market.'
In addition, during the last few years, new criticisms of the law
and economics school's position have been advanced. It has been
noted that unrestricted insider trading permits trading on bad news as
U.S. 19, 25-28 (1987) (applying McNally in an insider trading analysis, holding that intangible
interest in information is sufcient "property interest").
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 880-82; Easterbrook, supra note 22. at 331. Professor
Cox has observed that management's better access to information may give managers an advantage
in negotiating contracts with corporations. James D. Cox, Insider Trading Regulation and the
Production of Informatlon: Theory and Evidence, 64 WAsH. U. L.Q. 475, 476-77 (1986).
P See, g., Ferber, supra note 23, at 621; Schotland, supra note 23, at 1440-42.
See.g., Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 61, 66 (emphasizing that insider trading will adversely
affect investors' willingness to risk capital, therefore increasing the cost of capital for all firms);
Brudney, supra note 23, at 360 ('Mhe logic of the disclose-or-refrain rule precludes exploitation of
an informational advantage that the public is unable lawfilly to overcome or offset."); Haf, supra
note 23, at 1051 (stating that taking advantage of insider information that is unavailable to other
parties is inherently inequitable); Levnore I, supra note 23, at 124-25 (stressing that while insider
trading benefits some outsiders, it is harmful to outsiders as a group); Seligman, supra note 23, at
1090 (advocating a return to the parity of information standard); see also CiAMC, supra note 24, at
265-94.
"See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102
Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (creating liability for controlling persons, and
an express right of action for contemporaneous traders with insiders); Insider Trading Sanctions Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (imposing
treble damage penalties for insider trading). Professor Hamilton has noted that this legislation shows
that the law and economics arguments have "been emphatically rejected by Congress. ... 'Insider
trading damages the legitimacy of the capital market and diminishes the public's faith."' ROBERT W.
HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1050 (4th ed. 1990) (quoting H.R. REP. No.
910, supra note 20, at 8). The 1988 Act, for example, overrules Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), supra note 49, which had disallowed a private action by contemporaneous
traders based on an insider trading violation by one in a position like Chiarella (Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), discussed supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text) who owed no
preexisting duty to those trades. The Act adopted the misappropriation theory set forth in the dissent
of Chief Justice Burger in Chlarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), discussed supra note
50. See H.R. REP. No. 910, supra note 20, at 26.
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well as good, thereby giving rise to perverse incentives. -" In particu-
lar, several authors have made the suggestion that unrestricted insider
trading is not desirable because we should not want to give corporate
managers an incentive to create negative corporate developments in
order to secure personal gain.'
II. AN OPERATIONAL CRITICISM OF UNRESTRICTED
INSIDER TRADING-PLAY BALL!
The arguments of the law and economics types are simply misguided.
These commentators no doubt suffer from an insufficient appreciation of
the beauty of the national pastime in its purest form. This deficiency
probably stems from a failure to spend a sufficient number of summer
days on the field and nights by the radio listening to the games played by
their heroes.6 Perhaps if these anti-regulation commentators had
developed a love for the purity and fairness of our national pastime they
would have gained an appreciation for the problems that surround their
position on insider trading.
A. Trading Based on Negative Developments
The clear economic problem paralleling the baseball rules and
confronting those arguing for reduced restrictions on insider trading lies
in the ability of the inside players and traders to profit on negative
developments. This possibility exposes the enormous operational
" See Levmore I, supra note 23, at 149 (stating that "the temptation of profit might actually
encourage an insider to act against the corporation's interests"); Schotland, supra note 23, at 1452
(claiming that the pursuit of insider trading profits will distract the insider from corporate tasks);
Seligman, supra note 23, at 1095 (asserting that corporate inside traders can profit just as much from
adverse corporate news as good corporate news).
, See Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 49 (stating that unrestricted insider trading creates an
incentive to produce bad news); Haft, supra note 23, at 1056 (asserting that managers may exaggerate
information to their superiors in order to bring about a fall in prices); Levmore I, supra note 23, at
149 (stating that insider trading provides incentives to engage in subtle acts against the corporation);
Levmore II, supra note 23, at 104 (observing that insiders could profit by manipulating stock prices
to the detriment of the corporation), Seligman, supra note 23, at 1095 (claiming that "[i]nsiders
would have a personal incentive to delay the publication of news, whether good or bad");see also
CLAMK, supra note 24, at 267, 278 (insiders could manipulate information to make the company look
worse than it is and buy stock at a discount); cf Schotland, supra note 23, at 1449-51 (incentives to
manipulate trading on bad news attenuates concern for corporation's best interest). Manne asserted
that he had nothing significant to contribute on manipulation. Manne II, supra note 21, at 575. See
also Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L. 353, 355-
56 (1988) (recognizing the "moral hazard" problem but claiming contracts could be utilized to
prohibit trading on bad news).
" Some of them undoubtedly claim to be fans. But any professor can reinvent himself to be cool
and wear a Cubs hat to the law school. A true appreciation of baseball lies deeper. For beginning the
remediation, we suggest they see DAVID HALBERSrAM, SuMMwu OF '49 (1989).
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problems that would result if we allowed managers to trade on inside
information. The Black Sox scandal provides a comparison to support this
view.'
1. Effects on Everyday Operations
From an operational standpoint, insider trading presents several -
possible situations, each with its own set of incentives. Note, however,
that it may be argued that insider trading does not give rise to negative
incentives in all contexts. For example, if the manager is buying stock
based upon positive developments, the interests of the corporation and
those of the manager would appear to be compatible. Thus, insider
trading based on positive developments does not present as. great a
problem so far as corporate operations are concerned. Therefore, if this
activity is to be regulated, it may require some additional justification. 3
In contrast, trading on negative developments poses a serious problem
for corporate operations. Unrestricted insider trading would mean that
managers could freely trade on confidential or unreleased information
about negative developments relating to their company. This possibility
could seriously damage the operations of the company, as the managers
could profit by trading in advance of the release of negative information.
This could give the manager an economic incentive to cause the company
to fail or falter. In some circumstances, the manager may perceive
corporate failure to be a more attractive alternative than attempting to
make the company succeed and profiting from the positive incentives
given to the manager by the company. Such circumstances include those
where the profit from trading on negative information created by the
manager is sufficiently great to induce the manager to disregard the
welfare of the company. In any case, however, the interests of the insider
who has an incentive to seek stock price volatility would always seem to
be at odds with those of the shareholders, who seek increased value."
The harm from trading based on negative information is specifically
recognized in the securities laws. Section 16(c) of the 1934 Act prohibits
an executive from cashing in on negative corporate developments by
selling short his corporation's stock in massive quantities.' This
provision was enacted following congressional hearings and reports
revealing that a prominent banker manipulated the operations of his bank
in order to take advantage of trading in its stock by selling it short and
"See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
"See discussion hnfru notes 97-113.
"See Seligman, supra note 23, at 1095.
15 U.S.C. § 7 8 p(c) (1988).
" See supra note 30 for a definition of short sale.
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by using other manipulative practices.67 This history represents congres-
sional recognition of our thesis.'
This might suggest that the problem is actually a function of short
selling. However, such a position fails to properly reflect reality. It has
been acknowledged that eliminating short selling cannot eliminate gains
on bad news because "[m]anagers can sell their shares on bad news and
then replace them at a lower cost after the market reacts." 69
It is possible to demonstrate by way of example the potential for
difficulties in a world without restrictions on insider trading. Such
examples demonstrate the validity of the philosophy behind section 16(c)
and support its extension beyond the limited parties and situations to
which it currently applies.
Let us, therefore, take up our game in earnest with a few examples.
First, suppose that the manager in question is an extremely greedy and
impatient individual, much like, say, Chick Gandil. Gandil played a
central role in the Black Sox scandal by engineering the throwing of the
1919 World Series. In addition to taking payoffs, Gandil placed bets
against the Sox. Furthermore, Gandil was in charge of receiving the
payments from those who were buying off the Black Sox, and he
arranged for Eddie Ciccotte, the Sox's best pitcher and starter of the first
game of the Series, to receive the first $10,000.70 The payment to
Ciccotte was apparently effective, as he had a truly horrible first game,
allowing the Reds to score six runs in three and two-thirds innings en
route to a Sox defeat by a score of nine to one.' This was the decisive
beginning to the Sox defeat in this Series. Gandil later "retired to the
beautiful spa country of Napa Valley in Northern California."
If our manager is like Gandil, he is probably at the center of
operations. Perhaps if he is at the top of the management pyramid or at
some other key spot in the company, he may be able to destroy a key
business of the company and ultimately profit from his action or inaction.
- See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934); Stock Exchange Regulation:
Hearings on HR. 7852 and HR. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 134, 937 (1934). For a more complete history of this topic, see Steve
Thel, The Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42
HAsriNGs LJ. 391, 428-30 (1991) (arguing that section 16 discourages managerial manipulation of
corporate affairs for personal gain, and also promotes managerial interest inthe corporation's success).
,In stubborn resistance to this concept, Carlton and Fischel argue that allowing short selling
may give managers an incentive to pursue riskier projects. See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at
872.
Id. at 893 n.112.
'o See AsINoF, supra note 5, at 37-38. Gandil also was said to have batted poorly, such as by
failing to advance runners in the second game. Id at 84-85. Gandil batted .233 for the Series, as
compared to .290 in the season. See DAViD S. NEmf & RICHARD M COHEN, THE SPORTS
ENCYCLOPEDIA: BASEBALL 88, 91 (12th ed. 1992).
ASiNOF, supra note 5, at 65-69.
nSee id. at 284.
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Assume, for instance, that he is a bank CEO who initiates and imple-
ments with subordinates a loan program to developers of real estate in an
arid portion of Colorado. The loans are massive and the real estate, once
developed, does not sell. The developers are placed in bankruptcy and the
bank is forced to write off millions of dollars in loans.
If unrestricted insider trading is allowed, the CEO can profit from
this situation by selling the stock of the bank short or by writing call
options in the stock in massive quantity.73 If the profit from the
transactions is sufficiently great, he may not be concerned that his
actions ruin the company and cost him his position as CEO. Perhaps
he can buy Chick Gandil's old place in Napa Valley, or better still,
retire to a sailboat in the Caribbean, out of the reach of angry share-
holders.
To consider a second example, we might imagine that our manag-
er is more like Lefty Williams, the starting pitcher for the Black Sox
in the second game of the Series. Williams had one poor inning,
marked by an uncharacteristic loss of control.74 William "Cracker"
Schalk, the catcher, claimed that Williams kept "crossing" him in that
"lousy fourth inning."'  The fix was not so obvious as in the first
game, the Sox only losing four to two. Furthermore, they out-hit their
rivals. Williams was, on this occasion, less important and less obvious
than Ciccotte was in the first game.7' Nonetheless, his actions, even
if not as transparent as those of Ciccotte in the first game, still fur-
thered the fix.
Similar to Lefty Williams in the second game, our hypothetical
CEO may be less obvious in his maneuverings. Maybe he is not so
greedy and impatient, and has set up his scheme more subtly. Suppose
that he appears to fail to initiate timely actions or correctly perceive
unfolding events that affect his bank. For example, he might oppose
the bank's entry into promising new lines of business, such as insur-
ance or retail brokerage ventures, so that the bank suffers in relation
to its competitors. If he maintains his course of inaction, the bank's
stock will decline. Thus, he could profit in this scenario, as in the
first, while betraying the interests of his bank. Furthermore, in this
As noted in the text above, Section 16(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in many
cases, prohibits this type of selling short. However, in our examples, we are assuming a world
without restrictions on insider trading.
,See ASwNoF, supra note 5, at 86-88.
See id. at 88-89.
"In a subsequent game, Williams had a spectacularly bad first inning after receiving threats of
violence from someone apparently connected to the crooks. See id. at 84-85. This incident illustrates
a different proposition: once you get dirty or sell out, many other bad things can happen to you.
Williams's overall performance for the Series was miserable, as he lost three games and posted an
earned run average of 6.61. See Nm.r & COHEN, supra note 70, at 91.
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case the CEO may be able to maintain his position at the bank if the
stockholders erroneously believe that the bank's management is
legitimately too conservative to enter these markets, or that the com-
petition in the new markets is too great to warrant entry.
A third comparison of the 1919 Series to insider trading breaks
from the manipulation model of the first two examples. Here, the
CEO behaves like "Shoeless" Joe Jackson. Even though he had been
promised more, "Shoeless" got $5,000 from the crooks." His perfor-
mance in the Series, however, did not seem as deficient as that of
other players involved in the fix.78 He later confessed his participa-
tion in the scheme to the authorities, reportedly under some pressure,
and gave his grand jury testimony while drunk." Jackson
subsequently claimed his innocence.' It is thus conceivable that
what in fact transpir*ed was "Shoeless" took the money but still played
his best, perhaps thinking that he was cheating the crooks.
Similarly, our CEO might act in the best interest of his bank-as
"Shoeless" Joe Jackson conceivably did-in that he does not affirma-
tively attempt to harm the bank's operations. 1 Unforeseen problems
with the bank's finances, such as significantly lower earnings for the
quarter because of unanticipated loan losses, might cause the bank's
stock price to decline sharply. The bank executive, like "Shoeless"
Joe Jackson, might be tempted to profit from these circumstances,
though they are not the product of his efforts. The CEO could sell
stock in advance of the press release of that information and avoid
suffering a loss in value. Or he again may write options or sell the
stock short.' In any event, the executive profits by the negative
developments that occur to the corporation, even if these negative
developments are not caused by his own actions. 3 It is no more
appropriate to allow the executive to profit at his firm's misfortune,
under any of these scenarios, than it would be for "Shoeless" Joe
Jackson, Chick Gandil, or Lefty Williams to take money for acting
against their team's interest.
7' See AswoF, supra note 5, at 34, 104.
-See id. at 41-119. As has been reported, "[t]he average fan could not realize that Joe Jackson's
.375 batting average [for the Series] only camouflaged his intentional failings in clutch situations."
NFr & CoHEN, supra note 70, at 88. That figure exceeded his season average of .351 and he also
hit the only home run in the Series. NFfr & COHEN, supra note 70, at 88, 91.
See AsiNoF, supra note 5, at 175-77.
See id. at 292. Skeptics remain: "The recent notion that Joe Jackson, Lefty Williams et al were
the victims of injustice is childish, an emotional reaction to the story without respect for the facts....
There is overwhelming evidence against Joe Jackson." JAMEs, supra note 7, at 138-39.
"IThe core facts of this example are similar to those of Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910
(N.Y. 1969).
"See CLARK, supra note 24, at 278.
3 See id.
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Calls for empirical support to justify insider trading regulation!
should not be allowed to undercut that regulation. Since insider trading
is now prohibited in the United States, it is unlikely that much empirical
progress could be made. However, it should be noted that a small survey
of insider trading cases revealed that a substantial number were based on
bad news." Moreover, if the law and economics group believes so
strongly that the ability to make insider trades is a positive incentive to
do good work, then the negative incentive to profit from bad news also
must be recognized.' We suggest that some truths, such as the general
effect of monetary incentives, should be recognized. This would provide
for a small hold on reality.
2. Inadequacy of Supervisory and Fiduciary Duty Constraints
To the foregoing arguments, those in favor of loosening the
regulation of insider trading reply that such traders are subject to other
constraints that make regulation of insider trading unnecessary. These
advocates of reduced regulation argue that managers who perform poorly
may have their authority reduced.' Alternatively, they may be fired.'
Finally, they may be personally liable for their breach of fiduciary
duties.' Furthermore, these scholars of the law and economics camp
argue that managers do not operate with total independence. Therefore,
a single chiseler may not be able to significantly influence the course of
events necessary to injure the company.'e
These arguments are not persuasive. Such self-regulatory constraints
can be wholly inadequate if managers act quickly.9 Chick Gandil's
retirement to beautiful northern California and our hypothetical CEO's
'4See, eg., Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 63-65, 68; Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 338; Jill E.
Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV.
179, 219-20 (1991).
"See Scott, supra note 22, at 815-16 (reporting that 42 out of 115 defendants-or 37
percent-used bad news as basis of trading). This statistic caused Seligman to note that the percentage
probably would have been higher without the ban on short selling in § 16(c) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Seligman, supra note 23, at 1095 n.61.
" See Levmore II, supra note 23, at 104-05.
" See MAcBY H, supra note 22, at 35; Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 869, 892-93.
" See MAcEY II, supra note 22, at 35.
" See id. ("shareholders ... can bring suit derivatively against managers who violate their duty
of care").
" See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 873-74. Many of the recent insider trading cases
reveal that the culprits often act in pairs or groups. In addition, the Black Sox scandal shows that
insider trading can be a team sport. See ASINOF, supra note 5, at 41-119; supra notes 8-10, 70-80
and accompanying text.
" See generally Levmore I, supra note 23, at 149 n.85 (even though poor managers would
probably be fired, unlimited insider trading provides them incentives that are not certain to direct
efforts to "good work").
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hasty retreat to the Caribbeann underscore the shortcomings of such
deterrents. If these potential defendants cannot be found, they cannot be
sued.
The termination and fiduciary duty points are also insufficient to deal
with the more modest abuser of the corporate trust. Smaller chiseling is by
its nature harder to detect and police; even if the company does not perform
as well as it might, the CEO might not be viewed as the cause of the problem
and thus might not be terminated." Moreover, fiduciary duties may be
ineffective constraints. For example, absent proof of self-dealing, it is
usually only the most egregious cases that result in a finding of a breach of
the duty of care to properly manage the company.95
"Shoeless" Joe Jackson seemed to perform well in the 1919 Series.'
But how can we know whether it was his maximum effort? Similarly, it often
is difficult to determine if managers have acted in the best interest of their
firm.
B. Trading Based on Positive Developments
Even if insider trading is forbidden where the use of negative
developments is concerned, some contend that trading on positive
developments should be permitted because such trading is free from the
problems plaguing negative-developments trading. In fact, some argue that
allowing insider trading based on positive developments would serve to
cement the interests of the corporation and manager.97 Can this be justified?
In other words, should Pete Rose have been allowed to bet in favor of the
Reds with impunity?98
Those in favor of permitting insider trading that is not contrary to the
company's interest would rely heavily on their compensation argument. The
profits from insider trading would operate like a bonus, only better,' and
'
2 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
"See Levnore I, supra note 23, at 149 n.85 (noting that "it may be some time before a bad
news generator is discovered").
4 Macey notes that a manager who drives the price of stock down in order to profit by trading
"would certainly be in violation of his fiduciary duty of loyalty to his firm."MAcEY I, smpra note
22, at 35. In any event, such abuse would seem more difficult to prove than proving, for example,
that the manager sold short based on bad news whether or not he caused the negative developments.
" See eg., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (applying a gros negligence
standard to find a breach of the duty of care). The Van Gorkom case is viewed as a rarity. It created
a firestorm among the corporate bar and corporate board directors when it was issued, because it
represented the possibility that courts might find a violation of the duty of care where they rarely had
previously. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS 727-30 (4th ed. 1990).
"See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See MAcEY H, supra note 22, at 45.
"See supra notes 4, 12 and accompanying text.
"Better because, ostensibly, they do not cost the company or the shareholders anything. See
supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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would be a normal and desirable form of compensation."o Viewing inside
information as business property, law and economics scholars advocate
allowing parties to privately negotiate the extent to which employees may use
such information."0 ' It is further claimed that allowing such trading would
actually serve to reduce the cost of transacting because the manager could
renegotiate the contract continually by changing the level of his trading activi-
ty.'0
2
The compensation argument is inadequate to support unrestricted insider
trading. One problem with this justification is the ftct that insider trading is
simply not needed as a form of compensation. "Shoeless" Joe Jackson may
have deserved a larger salary, but our sympathies should not blind us to the
fact that ballplayers, like corporate managers, should look to their employers
to provide a bonus in formal terms.
If a bonus is desired, the corporation can pay the manager a bonus
directly. The use of insider trading profits to serve this function presents
several difficulties. 3 For example, the size of the "bonus" from insider
trading relates not to the managerA contribution to the corporate enterprise,
but strictly to his or her ability and tendency to trade in stock while in
possession of inside information.'" In fact, anyone in possession of the
confidential information could, as a theoretical matter, profit from its use even
if he or she did not contribute to the positive corporate developments.
05
Indeed, even if the trader did contribute to the success, the ability to profit
from it would be boundless, making any advance assessment of
commensurate compensation by the employer impossible."6
"' See MANNE I, supra note 21, at 135 (Insider trading profits are not subject to judicial review
and are not publicly disclosed. This eliminates the need for employer and employee to agree on the
value of services.).
See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 862-63, 889.
S' ee id. at 870-71. This continuous possibility would seem to make very difficult the
negotiation of an optimal contract that the finance literature suggests should exist. This optimal
contract results from principals seeking to maximize return on capital and agents seeking maximum
compensation for their best efforts. This agency model has been explained as "a formulation of the
principal's problem of choosing the 'best'employment contract for the agent. 'Best'is defined in the
context of Pareto-opfimality. A Pareto-optimal contract is such that no other contract can improve
the welfare of one party without reducing the welfare of the other."AMIR BARNeS EL AL., AGENcY
PROBLEMS AND FNAaCEI CoNTrAcrING 26 (1985); see also Douglas W. Diamond & Robert E.
Varrecchia, Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices, 37 J. FIN. 275, 276-77
(1982) (calculation of the optimal contract model).
"' See CtARK, supra note 24, at 277-80.
'u See Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 48; Levmore I, supra note 23, at 149; Schotland, supra note'
23, at 1455 & n.84. Even some in the law and economics camp have observed that the use of insider
trading profits as compensation is inefficient and perhaps akin to giving managers lottery tickets. See
Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 332; Scott, supra note 22, at 808.
10 See Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 48; Cox & Fogarty, supra note 60, at 356; Levmore 1, supra
note 23, at 149-50.
'" See CLrAc, supra note 24, at 274 (objecting to insider trading because it allows managers to
give themselves unlimited extra compensation, essentially giving them a "blank check to be exercised
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Moreover, shareholders actually gain very little by allowing insider
•trading based on good news. Such trading does not align management and
shareholder interests to the ektent often claimed 7 because they are not tied
together at the crucial time when management action affects operations. If
"Shoeless" Joe bet on the Sox, his bet before the game would have given him
an incentive to win. In contrast, insiders trade alter the "game" is over, but
before the result is posted. This means that the interests are not aligned during
the game, a fact that refutes the argument that insider trading ties the
executive's interests to those of the firm. This upside-only participation can
create an incentive to succeed, but it is not a complete alignment of interests;
an option to profit from positive developments is replete with hazards, such
as the possibility that managers will select more speculative projects that
might allow the option to pay off. The alignment argument is only an illusion,
and not much is gained by permitting insider trading based on good news.
We should also consider what is lost by allowing insider trading based
on positive developments. Unlike the insider traders, Joe would bet in
advance of the game, but even allowing Joe to do that creates difficulties.
Ballplayers generally cannot bet on their own performance."'a The reasons
for this policy also support the prohibition on insider trading based on good
news. The absence of such a ban could create perverse incentives. Joe might
work too hard in games he bet upon and rest in the others. Joe might even
hold back in games on which he has not bet, thus making his team falsely
appear to be a long shot in subsequent games, in hopes of increasing his rate
of return in the future when he does bet on his own team and plays his level
best. The team or the firm would not be helped by erratic or uneven perfor-
mances.
Agency law generally responds to the perverse incentives by requiring
that the agent' compensation be clearly articulated at the beginning of the
relationship, i.e., before the game begins. Absent agreement, all profit goes
to the principal."a Managers should not be allowed, in essence, to write
their own compensation contracts by way of insider trading. If Pete Rose had
bet on the Reds,"' the team certainly would not have approved his actions
on the theory that he was underpaid. A bonus or formal compensation plan
compensates directly and is limited to the terms expressly agreed upon by the
corporation and the manager. A system of allowing compensation through
unilaterally and secretly"); Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 49; Levmore I, supra note 23, at 150;
Seligman, supra note 23, at 1094-95 (noting that formal compensation is certain, whereas insider
trading profits are variable, leaving open the possibility of a mismatch between the contribution and
compensation).
See MAcEY II, supra note 22, at 45.
See Major League Rule 21(d), supra note 14.
1' R.srATEmENT (SEcoND) oF AoGEcy § 388 & cmt. c (1958).
... See supra notes 4, 12 and accompanying text.
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insider trading would fail to meet the standard of propriety and uprightness
that our society should expect of its leaders and managers.'
Nonetheless, one might argue that insider trading would be an appropriate
and inexpensive form of compensation when a corporation is suffering from
a financial bind or cash shortage. Difficulties arise here as well. The positive
developments at issue will ultimately allow for the payment of sufficient
compensation to managers, and if the deferral of compensation is further
required, there are several alternatives available, such as phantom stock or
warrants, to tie management's incentives to the success of the company."'
As these ties are made directly and explicitly, the use of insider trading is
unnecessary. For these reasons, we do not witness many companies lobbying
for the repeal of insider trading regulations in order to fairly compensate their
managers.1
3
Im. THE FAULTS OF "OPTING IN" TO INSIDER
TRADING REGULATION
A. Irrelevance of the Absence of Corporate Charters, Bylaws or Contracts
Prohibiting Insider Trading
The opponents of insider trading regulation argue that the corporations
that are to be protected have expressed no need for the protection, as
evidenced by the almost universal absence of insider trading prohibitions in
corporate charters, bylaws or contracts."4 If no one connected to the
corporation wants to restrict insider trading, why should the SEC be
concerned?
Similarly, critics have pointed out that other countries, particularly Japan,
have not found it necessary to enforce restrictions on insider trading in order
to ensure the integrity of securities markets. As has recently been noted,
"[i]nsider trading is considered an appropriate method of managerial
compensation in Japan."" 5 Moreover, it was recently stated that there has
"I See Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 66; Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading
Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 55 (1980).
"I See CiARK, supra note 24, at 278 (suggesting that stock option plans, stock bonus plans and
stock appreciation rights would provide managers with adequate incentives); Bainbridge, supra note
23, at 48-49 (proposing that managers who agree not to trade on inside information receive a
guaranteed bonus, thus allowing cost-effective compensation to be measured in advance); Levmore
I, supra note 23, at 150 n.86 (arguing that phantom stock plans, which tic reward directly to stock
price, would be appropriate forms of managerial compensation); Levmore II, supra note 23, at 104
(all positive incentives can be captured by other forms of explicit compensation such as stock
options); Seligman, supra note 23, at 1094.
"I See Levnore II, supra note 23, at 104.
"4 See Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 864, 873; Dooley, supra note 111, at 45-47;
Easterbrock, supra note 22, at 333.
.' MACEY II, supra note 22, at 44; see also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 860 n.16.
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never been a criminal prosecution for insider trading in Japan."6 If the
Japanese markets function well without active regulation of insider
trading,1 7 the natural question is why the American authorities should be
concerned about it. Professor Macey has forcefully asserted the apparent
advantages of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, noting Japan' failure to enforce
restrictions on insider trading:
Of particular interest [is] the complete lack of enforcement of the laws
in Japan. . . . The Tokyo Stock Exchange is roughly the same size as
the New York Stock Exchange. Trading on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
is highly automated, and investors enjoy unparalleled liquidity for their
shares. In recent years, corporate stock traded on the Tokyo exchange
has traded at a far higher price-to-earnings ratio than corporate stock on
the New York exchange. In other words, absolutely no evidence
indicates any crisis in confidence in the Japanese capital markets despite
the fact that "the Japanese stock market is an insider's paradise. There
is no clear rule of law prohibiting insider trading and no public record
of efforts to prevent the practice." As Carlton and Fischel have
observed, "In Japan ... insider trading is considered proper, and there
has never been a reported case under the limited insider trading
prohibition currently in effect."
Although the Japanese government, under pressure from the U.S.
State Department and the SEC, has enacted tougher laws against insider
trading, those laws have still not been enforced. Insider trading is
considered an appropriate method of managerial compensation in
Japan.... Indeed, the recent trend toward more elaborate insider
trading regulation appears to stem largely from U.S. pressures."'
Such arguments seem to indicate that America once again has fallen
behind Japan.
In reality, these attempts to rebut the need for insider trading regulation
by reference to the general lack of such regulation in either the American
private sector or in Japan are both misguided. The facts noted in such
arguments are either irrelevant to the question of whether to regulate insider
trading or reflect an incomplete picture of the situation.
"' Alan Wood, Why Japan Isn'tReady for Reform, Cm. TRi., Aug. 2, 1991, § 1, at 19; see also
Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 860 n.16.
" See Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of
Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. Rsv. 1007, 1047
(1990).
"' MAcBY I, supra note 22, at 44 (quoting Carry Rqxta, Declining Public Omershtp of
Japanese Industry: A Case of Regulatory Failure?, 17 L. JAPAN 153, 184 (1984); Carlton & Fischel,
supra note 21, at 860 n.16).
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The argument about the absence of corporate charters, bylaws or contract
provisions is flawed. The most obvious reason for the absence of such
provisions is that such activity is currently illegal in the United States.
Therefore, to provide contractual protection against insider trading would be
duplicative. For example, corporate charters, bylaws and contracts do not
typically prohibit embezzlement or theft even though such activities would
clearly harm the corporation. Like those on insider trading, such restrictions
are not necessary because the law already addresses the problem." 9 Since
charter provisions on this issue would he duplicative, their absence on
subjects such as theft or insider trading proves nothing.
One reply to this point might be that even before the development of the
regulatory prohibitions against insider trading during the 1940s to 1960s, there
were no corporate attempts to prohibit insider trading.'2 This prior absence
of the prohibitions might be used to show that there was no need for them
even before insider trading was unlawful. The fact that corporations never
saw insider trading as something that needed to be controlled might be
viewed as a significant indication that such trading does not harm
corporations.
There are two means of answering this latter point. First, the
argument ignores some historical events. Prior to the 1940s, the
practice of insider trading was seen as having a potentially negative
effect on corporate operations. During the hearings that led to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2' and particularly section 16(c)
of that Act,'" it was recognized that managers might manipulate
corporate operations negatively in order to profit by trading in the
corporation's stock."u The short selling restrictions in that provision
have been described as a principal purpose for the enactment of
section 16 of that Act." Thus, insider trading has actually been
perceived as evil and regulated in some form since the passage of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Second, reliance upon the absence of early regulation of insider
trading ignores the development of the learning curve on this subject.
Today, we are still learning about this practice. The 1930s and the
decades immediately preceding them marked the beginning of the
e CLaRK, supra note 24, at 275-76.
See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 333 ("IA]lnost no firms attempted to curtail insider trading
before the SEC's Cady, Robens decision in 1961.").
"' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)).
15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (1988).
'z, See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
See Conmittee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation
ofInsMer Trading-Pan H: Reform ofec.tio 16, 42 Bus. LAw. 1087, 1096 (1987); Thel, supra note
67, at 429.
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separation of ownership and management and the recognition of its
importance to corporate affairs."2 There is little reason to expect
that corporations would have had prohibitions against insider trading
before it was recognized as a potential problem.
A similar observation demonstrates the fallacy in using the
absence of Japanese enforcement of insider trading regulation to prove
the lack of harm in the practice. Foreign countries with growing
securities markets, including Japan, have learned as they develop, and
ultimately begin to regulate insider trading.'26 Whereas in the past
such increased regulation might have been slighted in the absence of
Japanese enforcement of such prohibitions, recent events may prompt
a reexamination of the dangers of insider trading.
The Japanese scandals of 1991 seem to have ignited a recognition
of the harm from corrupt practices, including insider trading. This has
led some Japanese investors to argue for more effective regulation and
enforcement of insider trading, including the creation of an enforce-
ment agency somewhat like the SEC. 7 In any event, we should be
hesitant to copy market practices of a society where gangsters have
been associated with recent manipulations involving securities firms,
and private disputes are often resolved by hiring thugs to intimidate
opposing parties into settlements. 2 ' Americans should operate on a
higher moral plane.
In addition, the recent collapse of stock prices in Tokyo signifi-
cantly reduces the persuasive power of a comparison to the Japanese
market. From late 1989 to mid-1992, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
experienced a decline in share prices of over sixty percent."n Fur-
' See ADOLF A. BERLE & GA.RDINER C. MEANs, THE MoDERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PRoPERTY 66-84 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1968) (1932).
"I See CLARM, supra note 24, at 276.
'7 See James Stermgold, Japan's Rigged Casino, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1992. § 6 (Magazine), at
24 (scandals have contributed to sharp loss in value on Tokyo Stock Exchange by hurting credibility
of market with respect to investors; despite scandals, reform of market is unclear;, Eiji Suzuki's
commission demanded independent agency like SEC, but under bureaucratic pressure the agency will
be controlled by Finance Ministry); Insider Trading, Japanese Syle; The Prime Minister Offers a
Bold and Necessary, Reform Program, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1991, at B6.
The finance literature has recognized such problems coming in recent years. Finance writers
report that the Japanese have been experiencing many problems in their financial markets resulting
directly or indirectly from insider trading. See Michael Whitener, Japan Tackles Insider Trading, 7
INT'L FIN. L. Rnv. 15-17 (1988); John F. Imhof, Jr., Note, The PatlWogy of Insider Trading and
Japan's Amended Seurities Exchange Law, 16 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 235-270 (1990).
See Sterngold, supra note 127, at 24, 48.
See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Is Japan Ready to Bottom Out?, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 1992, § 3,
at 17 (reporting market down 57.4% since end of 1989); William Power, Big Board at Age 200,
Scrambles to Protect Grip on Stock Market, WALL ST. J., May 13, 1992, at Al ("staggering 52%
plunge in share prices from the late-1989 high");James Sterngold, Japan's Prime Minister Calls
Meeting on Plunging Stocks, N.Y. TIm-s, July 24, 1992, at Dl (down more than 60% since end of
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thermore, the Japanese security markets continue to appear mired in
a loss of confidence:"3 "'There has been a collapse in the
confidence in the way the market is valued."""1 This recent history
casts serious doubt on the law and economics camp's assertions that
the Japanese model is desirable. It is mystifying why America should
emulate a market that performs as Japan's has in recent months. Just
as American baseball remains superior to Japanese baseball, the
integrity of the American security markets should not be lowered to
the level found in Japanese markets in some misguided attempt to
copy the competition.
B. The SEC as Public Enforcer of Private Prohibitions
Some opponents of broad regulation of insider trading would
permit individual corporations to prohibit the practice even if it were
not outlawed."3 The possibility of customized regulation of insider
trading raises a number of interesting questions. The immediate
concern would be enforcement. The advocates of a system allowing
for such limited contractual decisions to prohibit insider trading often
advocate public enforcement of the prohibition, arguing that such
enforcement might be necessary in light of economies of scale and
difficulties with detecting violations."
1989); Stemgold, supra note 127, at 24 (reporting that "Tokyo Stock Exchange is well into the third
year of a tailspin that has erased about 50 percent of the market's value since its peak at the end of
1989").
'" See Fuerbringer, supra note 129, at 17; James Sterngold, Japanese Stock Market Remains in
a Rut, N.Y. Tiims, Apr. 21, 1992, at D2.
"I Sterngold, supra note 130, at D2 (quoting Robert Wicks, manager of equity sales at James
Capel Pacific Ltd., Tokyo).
... See, ag., MAcEY II, supra note 22, at 4-6; Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 331.
I See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 334-35 (private enforcement less efficient than public
enforcement because it is difficult to separate proper from improper trades, and economies of scale
suggest need for public enforcement, perhaps with use of organization like stock exchange to monitor
trades); Haddock & Macey I, supra note 22, at 1462 n.28 (not clear that SEC is best enforcer, but
"some entity, either the SEC, the exchanges, or the common law courts" could enforce voluntary
agreements); Haddock & Macey II, supra note 22, at 329-30 (suggesting that under one model it was
a "small matter"for the NYSE to analyze computer data for insider trading patterns and that the SEC
could prosecute if discovered); Macey I, supra note 22, at 59-63 (recognizing the benefits of public
enforcement, yet arguing that due to prohibitive costs and conflicting SEC policies, a better solution
would be a central monitoring system combined with elective private enforcement); cf. Haft, supra
note 23, at 1069 (citing WLLIAM CARY & MELvIN ESENBERG, CORPORATIONS 728-29 (5th ed.
1980)) (difficulty of detection of insider trading suggests that a double or treble recovery by the
corporation is most "realistic"). But see Bainbridge, supra note 23, at 62 (suggesting that businesses
themselves would have voluntarily curtailed insider trading if the practice were undesirable). These
observations are used to explain the lack of private attempts at enforcement Carlton & Fischel, supra
note 21, at 890-91 (because public enforcement of "dubious value"and "may entail substantial costs,"
suggesting private firm enforcement, possibly -by arranging for stock exchanges to monitor
transactions). A tentative regulator generally agrees that private enforcement is impractical and that
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Nevertheless, it would be very odd to have the SEC police a
contractual arrangement that would be customized for each corpora-
tion. The required monitoring would be extremely burdensome. It is
one thing for governmental agencies to track down simpler crimes
with a paper trail or to look for stolen goods in likely places once
alerted by the aggrieved party; it is quite another for a government
agency to monitor vast numbers of superficially legitimate transac-
tions, all of which appear very similar on the surface, in the hope that
some of them might fit within the "customized" prohibitions of one
of the corporations involved."M
In addition, the ability to opt into a regulatory scheme would be
very unusual. This recommendation would mean that a corporation's
decision to opt in by private contract would make insider trading by
that corporation's managers a criminal offense. 35 It is inconceivable
that baseball would allow the Sox or the Reds to fail to opt into its
regulations. Why should the SEC and the market do so for some
firms? If insider trading presents a problem, it is a general problem
that gives inappropriate incentives that could affect corporate opera-
tions negatively and allows for boundless and unjustified
compensation unrelated to managerial efforts. No customized opt-in
regulation should be allowed for each corporation; such trading should
remain outlawed.
So what is the reason for advocating limited private prohibitions
enforced by a public agency? In a word it is sophistry. Such opt-in
provisions would probably not be used by the vast majority of man-
agement-controlled corporations, and the SEC's task in detecting
violators would be made virtually impossible by the adoption of such
a system. The concession for a limited prohibition of insider trading
on a contractual basis is made in order to give the remaining
public enforcement would be more efficient because the practice is "extremely difficult to detect"
with only the SEC and the exchanges comterizod for monitoring. Id Carlton and Fischel have
greater faith in private enforcement than the others. Carlton & Fischel, supra note 21, at 864 (arguing
that bans on insider trading contained in corporate charters or employment contracts would deter the
majority of potential inside traders). For Macy's latest suggestion on enforcement, see MACY II,
supra note 22, at 5-6 (difficulties of detection of improper trades, economies of scale, and necessity
of fines and imprisonment mean that monitoring and enforcement of restrictions on insider trading
are "best discharged by a government agency").
" To some extent this problem might be relieved if the trading data collected were turned over
to the corporation for analysis. See Macey I, supra note 22, at 63.
" See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 334 (calling for "public prosecution," with 'jail"and "fines"
as penalties). Because of the low probability of detection it is argued that heavy fines or perhaps
imprisonment would be needed as sanctions to deter violators of these private arrangements. See
RiCHAaRD A. Pos.Rn, ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF THE LAW 209-10 (3d ed. 1986). It is also interesting
that the criminal sanctions suggested by the law and economics camp are often seen as being less
efficient than monetary penalties.
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arguments against a broad prohibition on insider trading some
respectability. It is simply necessary in order to allow the analogy to
other property rights situations to have relevance. But at the same
time, the proposal must be exposed for what it really is: improbable,
impractical and objectionable on other grounds.
CONCLUSION
Baseball has not been completely pure. The recent Pete Rose
affair'" illustrates that beneath the surface there are always some
problems. Nonetheless, baseball has taken a firm stand to negate the
possibility that an entire team of players would ally with bettors to
throw a World Series.'37 The sport has been made better for these
efforts.'" We should all admire the pure form of the sport as we
remember from our summers as youths on the sandlots, in the ballpa-
rks and listening to the radio-so that we will not again hear the cry
"Say it ain't so, Joe."' 39
The regulation of insider trading holds the promise for protection
of firms and their shareholders. Regulation should not be undercut by
reliance upon ill-conceived economic-based arguments that do not
adequately account for the economic incentives present for managers
to abuse both the firms and shareholders, and various other unseemly
aspects arising from insider trading.
Will "The Thrill" Clark cannot bet against the San Francisco
Giants and Lee Iacocca should not be permitted to sell Chrysler stock
short based on his access to confidential corporate information."
If regulations against insider trading were dropped, then our'other
national pastime of "playing the market," or investing, would become
a cruel farce as corrupt as the 1919 World Series. Both practical
considerations and the need to preserve the purity of the game require
the continuation of insider trading prohibitions.
I,' See supra notes 4, 12 and accompanying text.
' See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
,' See JAmEs, supra note 7, at 138-39.
, AsnoF, supra note 5, at 121.
"' This is not to suggest that either Clark or Iacocca would even be inclined to do so; each is
truly a great American success story in his own right. We chose them as examples who appear
beyond the temptations of this sort of thing so that no questionable characters would take offense.
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